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Abstract
Recent research by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Space Systems
Laboratory has demonstrated a system engineering and architecting framework that
enables the creation and quantitative comparison of numerous, unique space system
architectures.  The foundation for this method is the belief that all satellite systems are
information disseminators that can be represented as information transfer networks.
This paper uses that work as a foundation and addresses its inadequacy in accounting for
the more difficult to quantify operational issues associated with space systems.  The
Lean Aerospace Initiative, in concert with the Space Systems, Policy, and Architecture
Research Center, supported this research.
The first phase of this research involved a series of structured interviews with major
civil, defense, and commercial satellite manufactures.  System engineers, at a variety of
organizational levels, were questioned about the current set of techniques used to
evaluate spacecraft command and control system designs.  In addition, data was
collected on how operational concerns were addressed in the conceptual and preliminary
design phases of development.  This results shows that operational issues, although
beginning to play a significant role in preliminary space system design, do not play a
significant role in conceptual space system design.  These interviews supported the
development of an operations complexity metric that can be used to evaluate intelligent
command and control schemes in complex, multi-satellite space systems.
A space mission was studied, in the second phase of this research, using the previously
demonstrated system engineering and architecting framework but with the inclusion of
the new operations complexity metric to compare different architectures.  The space
system’s mission was to collect data on ionospheric disturbances for use in ionospheric
weather forecasting.  A computer model was developed that produced a frontier of
4optimal space system architectures given the specific objectives of the satellite
constellation.
This effort has developed and demonstrated an operations complexity metric to expand
the viability of quantitative space architecture analysis.  This metric is robust enough to
accommodate advanced command and control technology, such as software agents, that
are poised to revolutionize space operations and enable highly autonomous
constellations of satellites.  The use of the metric showed that it quantified operational
issues with relatively easily collectable data, minimized misinterpretation of the design
method, and relied on reasonable assumptions.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Joyce M. Warmkessel
Title: Senior Lecturer, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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"The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered"
Louis Sulliman, 1896
It is my belief that it is of the very essence of every problem that it contains and
suggests its own solution. This I believe to be natural law. Let us examine, then,
carefully the elements, let us search out this contained suggestion, this essence of
the problem. (…)
All things in nature have a shape, that is to say, a form, an outward semblance, that
tells us what they are, that distinguishes them from ourselves and from each other. -
- Unfailingly in nature these shapes express the inner life, the native quality, of the
animal, tree, bird, fish, that they present to us; they are so characteristic, so
recognizable, that we say, simply, it is 'natural' it should be so. (...)
Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight or the open apple-blossom, the toiling
work-horse, the blithe swan, the branching oak, the winding stream at its base, the
drifting clouds, over all the coursing sun, form ever follows function, and this is the
law. (...)  It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things
physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all
true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that life is recognizable in
its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the law.  -- Shall we, then,
daily violate this law in our art? Are we so decadent, so imbecile, so utterly weak of
eyesight, that we cannot perceive this truth so simple, so very simple? (...)
Is it really then, a very marvelous thing, or is it rather so commonplace, so
everyday, so near a thing to us, that we cannot perceive that the shape, form,
outward expression, design or whatever we may choose, of the tall office building
should in the very nature of things follow the functions of the building?
12
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The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously
the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that
decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature
and with each other.
- Thomas S. Kuhn
Chapter 1:  Introduction
This chapter will lay the essential groundwork required to understand the motivation and
objectives of this research.  This chapter will also provide a roadmap that describes the
direction of the remaining chapters.
Motivation and Objectives
The engineering process is focused on trading different design elements.  How these
tradeoffs or design decisions are made impact the efficiency or usefulness of a given
product for a given user.  Each user is different; often having wildly varying needs and
uses for the product.  Automobiles, as an example, are made large and small, roomy and
tight, fast and slow, plus expensive or cheap.  There is frequently close competition
within niches but, generally, each car model is unique.  With the addition of specific
options, to include nonfunctional choices such as color, a car can be ordered to suit very
specific needs.
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As complex systems, spacecraft have similar design choices as automobiles.  A
spacecraft can have different means for attitude control, different power generation
capabilities, and different levels of redundancy.  A spacecraft engineer can be assisted by
a host of tools to assist in the most effective design, but personal experience often plays
a significant role.
Automobile design decisions are disparate from space systems.  The infrastructure for
each automobile is in place.  Roads and gas stations have already been built.  Mechanics,
when repairs are necessary, are always waiting for business.  There is a commonly
accepted means of driving each automobile, so learning how to drive is a once in a
lifetime event and need not be relearned for each vehicle.  All of these components; the
car, gas station, road, mechanic, and user; can be conglomerated into an “automotive
transportation architecture.”  Design decisions have been made, over many decades, that
impact how a new component fits into this architecture; an example of this design
evolution are drivers sitting on the left and driving on the right side of U.S. roads.
Space systems often follow a similar evolution.  A common set of components or
techniques may be purposefully reused to fit into a predefined architecture.  This is, in
fact, a major emphasis of manufactures.  Redesigning components for each new vehicle
is expensive, just as inventing a new type of steering wheel for each new car model
would not be cost effective.
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Yet, automobile engineers are fortunate in that they have a stable architecture.  In fact, it
has been demonstrated with the drive for alternate fueled vehicles that changing the
system architecture is difficult, for a variety of technical, social, political reasons.  Many
space systems do not have the luxury of a stable architecture.  New technology is
developed, creating the potential for new missions and often requiring different “space
architectures.”  The space system architectures under examination are much more
complex than today’s designs.  These architectures, often relying on distributing tasks
among multiple satellites and therefore present unique problems for space operations,
are made possible by evolutionary and revolutionary technology and are the focus of this
research.
Three objectives guide this thesis.  The first objective is to document the real-world
integration of space operations into conceptual space system design, using current
systems engineering practices and political framework.  The second objective is to
develop a quantitative means to assess different space system architectures, with of focus
on distinguishing those that account for operations issues; e.g. designed for operability.
The final objective is to demonstrate this newly developed analytical method in the
design of complex space system architecture.  This demonstration is framed to highlight
the implementation process, not the specific architectural results.
Roadmap
Chapter 1 has provided the rough framework for this research.  This framework will be
further developed in Chapter 2 by a more bounded problem definition and approach.
The two subsequent chapters focus on space system engineering; the first dedicated to
16
the current state of space systems engineering while developing policy
recommendations, with the second highlighting novel system engineering processes.
Chapter 5 discusses the core technology area of future space operations: space system
autonomy.  Chapter 7 develops and analyses the results the conceptual space system
model.  Chapter 8 provides recommendations for further work and concluding thoughts.
Figure 1-1 is a graphical representation of the chapter flow.





















Whether you believe you can do a thing or not, you are right.
- Henry Ford
Chapter 2:  Research Design
This chapter covers both the identification of the research problem and a review of the
processes used to complete the research.  The first section provides a boundary for the
work by defining the specific research questions and hypotheses.  The second section
reviews the formal research methods, including the structured interview questions and
motivation for the use of parametric modeling.
Problem Identification and Scope
This research is predicated on two hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that spacecraft
command and control schemes are currently designed to address development time and
costs with designers placing less than adequate emphasis on meeting operational
requirements.  The second hypothesis states intelligent command and control
technology, which allows high degrees of space system autonomy, is an enabling
technology for highly complex space architectures.  A premise is that modeling
conceptual space system architectures provides is an easy means to assess a large
numbers of unique space architectures.
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The focus on conceptual space mission design was carefully chosen because, as will be
demonstrated in Chapter 3, it is this phase in a system’s lifecycle where the magnitude of
the cost is solidified.  A tighter focus is required for a precise definition of the scope of
this research.  The research boundary is not entire conceptual design process but it rather
concentrates on integrating autonomy and complexity into space operations modeling.
The intent of this research is not to quantitatively address the policy issues but to first
develop and demonstrate an analysis method that is robust enough to accommodate
revolutionary command and control technology.  The final dimension to the research
scope is the type of space systems.  Concentration was placed on Earth-orbiting civil,
commercial, and defense space missions.  The decision to exclude interplanetary
spacecraft was motivated because of the unique requirements for spacecraft autonomy
due to communication latency.
Problem Approach
The research approach is multifaceted, being based on both structured interviews and
analytical method design.  Figure 2-1 depicts the process the author followed for this
thesis.  Like many other research endeavors the early stages of this research was
characterized by a narrowing of potential research areas.
19
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This led to the investigation of autonomous systems for space operations and the first
series of interviews.  During this first phase, the broad objective was a deeper
understanding of how space systems are operated.  However, the focused goal was a
greater understanding of the cost and performance implications of autonomy on
spacecraft.  In particular, the implementation difficulties of spacecraft automation were
of interest.  A set of questions were developed that helped facilitate interviews with
operators and spacecraft engineers at space operations centers.  These questions
attempted to capture how autonomy was impacting morale; satellite knowledge base,
e.g. “corporate knowledge;” and anomaly resolution.  The ensuing site visits included a
prolonged visit to one National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) facility,
and brief visits to five U.S. Air Force facilities.
In this phase of the research process, the author was involved in a space operations
modeling effort called the Conceptual Operations Design Evaluator (CODE).  This
project, the result of a class guided by this thesis supervisor Dr. Joyce Warmkessel,
designed and created a working software package to perform parametric evaluations of
unique operational architectures for different space missions.  To do so, the class
developed a generic modeling framework that attempted to capture the key functional
relationships of space operations.  This effort proved influential in that it attempted mold
the Generalized Information Network Analysis (GINA) methodology, which will be
introduced more appropriately in Chapter 4, into a unique design construct, that of
continuous space operations.
21
As a result of the marginally successful translation of the GINA methodology and the
feedback gained from the operations center site visits, a objectives of the research were
fined tuned to included the development of an analysis technique for including
operations in conceptual space mission design.  This led to a second series of interviews
and closer involvement with MIT’s Space Systems, Policy, and Architecture Research
Consortium (SSPARC).
The second set of interviews, more structured than the first, were focused on spacecraft
manufacturers.  The targets for these interviews were personnel that had a holistic
perspective on spacecraft design yet maintained a knowledge base of operational issues
and solutions.  Each interview began with introductory remarks and general questions to
record the organizational background and experience, to ascertain both the interviewees’
level of technical knowledge, to determine which space systems he or she was most
familiar.  The questions listed in Figure 2-2 were then addressed, as relevant, to each
interviewee.
Figure 2-2:  Structured Interview Questions
1. What are the main drivers of operations complexity?
2. What processes are used to ensure the spacecraft command and control
system meets operational requirements?
3. How does the customer constrain the spacecraft command and control and
ground operations concept design decision?
4. How are competing command and control schemes evaluated?
5. What metrics do you use to judge the performance of command and control
systems?
6. How you do see the use of artificial intelligence technology, such as software
agents, impacting the design of spacecraft operations?
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This structured interview process proved very valuable as a flexible yet focused means
to collect data from a variety of individuals.  In total this round of interviews included
nine sites; including seven aerospace contractors, two NASA, and one USAF locations;
and 33 interviewees.  The interviewees ranged from former CEO’s and Chief Engineers
to lower-level spacecraft subsystem engineers.  The triangulation of themes; based on
contractor, USAF, and NASA perspectives; provided a broad survey of the current state
of conceptual space system design.
The final phase of the research was devoted to developing and implementing a
conceptual space system analytical method.  This method was integrated with the second
instantiation of the SSPARC Space Architecture Analysis Process.  The subject of this
design effort was call Terrestrial Observing Swarm-B, or B-TOS.
Summary
This three-phase research project was conducted over two years to fulfill the author’s
graduate degree requirements.  It included two sets of interviews, one with space
operations personnel, and the other with conceptual spacecraft designers.  The results
from these interviews were combined with experience in conceptual space system
modeling to produce an analytical method for the conceptual design of complexity and




Chapter 3:  Space Systems Engineering Framework
The concept of systems engineering has been alluded to in the previous chapter.  The
following is intended to place a boundary on systems engineering and introduce the
system engineering process, focus on the results of the structured interviews, then
address policy recommendations for successful conceptual design in the context of
national security needs.
Space Systems Engineering Process Overview
The term systems engineering is a product of the Bell Telephone Laboratories.  Its
processes have been refined since the early 1900’s but gained wider use after successful
application during World War II [Hall, 1962].  A system is typically defined as a
collection of hardware, software, people, facilities, and procedures to accomplish some
common objective [Buede, 2000].  System engineering is the integration of multiple
disciplines with multiple objectives to create synergistic and successful combinations of
subsystems.  (Buede [2000] provides a table with six other, somewhat loquacious,
definitions.)  The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and the
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Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA), among other organizations, maintain standards for
systems engineering processes.  These standards describe a system lifecycle that begins
with requirements generation transitions into concept development.  The concept
development phase is often when engineers make the first design choices that define the
level of autonomy in a system.
The concept definition process in the concept development phase can short circuit the
creative process and let the system designer unknowingly rule out potential solutions.
Although the purpose is not to reduce the tradespace, this often occurs in complex
systems to provide a more accessible boundary to a very complex tradespace.
The importance of the concept development phase is emphasized because of the amount
of cost commitment incurred during this phase in relation to the subsequent phases.  As
















Figure 3-1:  Cost Commitment and Incursion in the System Lifecycle [Buede, 2000]
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the cost commitment while the significant portion of the cost incurred typically occurs
during production.  This should motivate the systems engineer to take special care in the
initial concept development and analysis.  Unfortunately, this is all too often not the
case.  Political, institutional, or social pressures are prevalent and force early reduction
in the tradespace to make the new system conformable to current systems.  This research
will concentrate on this early stage of system design; the difficult stage where system
parameters are most fluid and the tradespace is largest, but one in which disciplined
decision making can be best leveraged.
Interview Results and Discussion
In this section, each of the six interview questions will be addressed individually
followed by themes common to many of the interviews.
What are the main drivers for operations complexity?
The interviewees answered this question on a variety of levels based on their personal
space operations experience.  The need to maintain proper service was a repeated ideal.
Many described typical customers as very conservative with a desire to only use
operations concepts based on heritage in order to reduce complexity.  Reducing lifetime
and/or system redundancy could also decrease this complexity.  The responses are
summarized in the following list, not necessarily in order of impact:
·  Spacecraft mass.  Mass acts as a surrogate for many hard to identify factors that
increase complexity when a spacecraft grows heavier.  These spacecraft usually
contain more systems that have more complex interfacing constraints.
Nevertheless, the opposite may be true as well; in one circumstance, two
computers were used for power management and control functions in order to
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reduce mass.  The interface for these two computers lead to more a more
complex operational environment but the design reduced total spacecraft mass, or
alternatively allowed more payload mass.
·  Date rate:  Data rate drives the ground communication network requirements and
spacecraft data recorder size.
·  Operations concept:  In a similar vein as data rate, the operations concepts driver
requirements by dictating the number and location of the ground antennas and
how they are integrated into the operations center.
·  Length of time the system is supposed to operate autonomously:  This directly
effects the complexity of the autonomous systems and therefore operations
complexity.
·  Orbit:  The type of spacecraft orbit will define the frequency of propellant burns
for maneuvers or station keeping.
·  Payload: The type of data collected, the level of command planning (for
example, turning off a ground sensor over an ocean), and payload instrument
complexity all impact the operations complexity.
Unrecognized complexity was seen as major cause of ground segment design problems.
This manifested itself as difficulties troubleshooting errors in the system.
What processes are used to ensure the spacecraft command and control system meets
operational requirements?
As was expected, the space system specifications were used by many designers to ensure
the command and control systems meet requirements.  Often these specifications, or
predictions of these specifications, were derived from previous space system designs.
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This question was anticipated, but failed, to frame the boundary between operational
requirements and political forces driving space system design.  From a contractor
perspective, the requirements and derived specifications were by far the most significant
influences on spacecraft design.
How does the customer constrain the spacecraft command and control and ground
operations concept design decision?
The responses to this question varied based on the type of customer.  Defense missions
were very restrictive and place many constraints on which operations concept to use.
The civil science mission varied based on the necessity to process real-time data.
Commercial users usually did not have the in-house expertise to place large constraints
on specific design decisions.
How are competing command and control schemes evaluated?
On a system level, little evidence indicated that command and control schemes are
effectively evaluated.  This is often driven by different parts of the customer’s
organization funding different parts of the space system lifecycle.  For Department of
Defense missions, the acquisition contracts typically originate from a different unit and
use different “color” of money than the operational contract.  This has created
suboptimal solutions in the opinion of many interviewees.  There is not an adequate
closed feedback loop for operational issues, the negative aspects of operational design
are communicated from the operator to the designers but positive feedback is
unavailable.
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On a spacecraft level, different schemes are evaluated based on a trade off between cost,
schedule, and development risk.  The initial trades usually focus on the spacecraft’s
ability to maintain proper communication and then their ability to maintain attitude
control.  The resulting attitude control system design drives the software requirements.
After throughput and interface requirements are developed, the design team reviews
existing systems available and selects the components based on the needed abilities.
What metrics do you use to judge the performance of command and control systems?
This question was expected to define the quantitative measures used to distinguish
potential system designs.  Unfortunately, the overwhelming response, for the conceptual
design of space systems, was that only minimal analysis is done to evaluate different
command and control schemes.  The design decisions were primarily based on system
requirements, such as having the capability for 90-day autonomous operations and a 2-
hour recovery period from anomalies.  The mission goals, such as data timeliness goals,
drove communication link sizing and on-board collection rate and data dump times.
Other time-based mission goals included mean time between downtime events and mean
time to restore function.  Unfortunately, these metrics would be particularly hard to
estimate during conceptual spacecraft design.  Cost was another metric used to judge
operations schemes.  Three costs were listed in order of priority:  cost of normal
operations, cost of operations crew training, and cost of the hardware and software
operating licenses.
The most pessimistic perspective voiced was that the trades were done ad hoc, with no
real consideration to the system wide impacts.  Every design team uses their own
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experts, made possible by a small “brotherhood” of engineers that have experienced a
variety of programs and therefore have sufficient intuition to make the tradeoffs.
From the console operator perspective, the most effective operations schemes are those
that reduce loading on individual operators, automate data sharing, reduce operations
fatigue through have autonomous warnings and operator control over computer screen
layout.  They maximize spacecraft autonomy and require simple training that is easy to
assess.
Unfortunately, all of these metrics were accessible on from the perspective of a
thoroughly designed system.  Abstracting these measurements to the level required for
conceptual system design proves difficult.
How you do see the use of artificial intelligence technology, such as software agents,
impacting the design of spacecraft operations?
One objective of the initial interviews associated with this research was to qualify the
current level of autonomous technology in use today.  The results of the second
interviews collaborated the finding that very few systems have a significant level of
automation, either on board the spacecraft or in the ground system.  Therefore, the
system engineers had limited first-hand experience integrating advanced autonomous
technology into space system designs.  The experience base of many was at the level of
expert systems, a technology that provides a set of recommendations if a predetermined
event occurs.
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The interviewees proposed many explanations for why autonomous technology has not
been more fully integrated with spacecraft design.  Perhaps the most significant reason
was low risk tolerance.  Large space systems do use deterministic based anomaly
detection and resolution systems or redundancy management systems, but only when the
mission length or criticality allows the development of such systems.  Even if the lack of
available on-board processing capability does not steer the design team away from
autonomy technology, the inherent difficulty in testing the software in an operational
environment is significant hurtle.  Lack of insight into the exact nature of a problem,
when one arises, also demotivates operators from allowing space systems to run
autonomously.
One interviewee made a particular point that is significant to this research.  The analysis
of conceptual space mission design should be focused on the highest-level design
decisions.  Knowing what should be included as significant tradeoffs is gained by
personal experience.  The interviewee agreed that autonomy technology drives selection
of spacecraft components, but questioned whether it actually drives architecture
selections.
Overarching Themes
The interviews facilitated discussion on issues separate from those specifically addressed
in the questions.  The themes of these discussions revolved around 1) making
architecture decisions, 2) the development of ground and flight software, 3) conceptual
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design centers, and 4) the pros and cons of using autonomous system.  Since these
themes are germane to the architecture analysis process, they are addressed in the
following paragraphs.
Architecture Decisions:  The early architectural decisions have been, from one
perspective, the result of negotiations between the user, the acquiring organization
representing the user, and the prime contractor.  In the Department of Defense and
NASA cases, the government entity has in the past dictated the architecture for the
mission.  The launch vehicle is selected and the ground operations scheme is selected
and guides the spacecraft conceptual design.  This has especially been the case with
relatively simple space missions.  With larger systems, more common in the DoD than
NASA, new ground operation facilities are constructed to support the new space
missions.  With the simpler designs, the major tradeoffs involve satellite bus selection
and outfitting that bus to support the specific payload.  The Rapid Spacecraft
Development Office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center is an example of an
organization that uses bus databases to make quick assessment of conceptual designs.
They are not trading the architectures necessary to carry out the missions, just the space
components that integrate into the already operations centers.  This rapid design
technique is also used in commercial systems such as geostationary communication
satellites.  The contractors are able to reuse flexible spacecraft busses to reduce
development time and cost.
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Using spacecraft bus databases is not an option the more complex space systems, many
of which are funded by the DoD.  In these cases, when architecture decisions were made,
the early involvement of contractors in key decisions was helpful to resolve technical
conflicts.  The integration of space operations issues early in the design process has been
hindered by program managers trying to reduce near-term costs or due to general lack of
foresight.  In cases where operations have been a key part of space mission design, it has
been dictated and not evaluated in the context of the entire space system.
No space system has the luxury of beginning with a clean sheet of paper.  All space
system must fit into larger “systems” that integrate the products of the mission.  New
communication satellites must be able to communicate with old ground terminals,
especially if replacing or updating the terminals is cost prohibitive.
Conceptual Design Centers:  Spacecraft manufacturers have been using novel
techniques to quickly assess conceptual space designs.  These design centers are
structured to provide a quick look at what is feasible to build and how much it could
cost.  The goal is to gain high-level insight in a potential system, not to specific precise
values for each component.  Concurrent design tools are used in these design centers to
facilitate the quick day- to week-long exercises that focus on one design solution.  They
typically use integrated spreadsheets with engineering and cost models to determine
rough performance and lifecycle cost numbers.  The results have been successful in
exploring the impact of undemonstrated technology.  The process does not, however,
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lend itself to studying large quantities of architectures, but they are able to look at a
small number in greater detail than without concurrent engineering tools and techniques.
COTS Software:  The reuse of software is another key decision that spacecraft
engineers must make.  This decision directly impacts the integration of the system into
current operations centers.  The use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software
products has been motivated by the drive to reduce space mission costs and to allow a
contractor to focus on its key profit sector, satellite manufacturing; but some programs
have been unsuccessful in their attempt to efficiently COTS software.  If the COTS
vendor is incapable of modification, it was recommended to not procure that software
and develop a new product.  The cost savings does not sufficiently outweigh the
decrease in software stability.  Increase functionality may motivate software
modification but oftentimes the cost savings is only realized if standardized software is
used on all satellites in a multiple satellite space system.  Even if many satellites are
purchased together, they are constructed at different times and components change or
evolve.  These differences are often sufficient to require software changes, which can
increase the integration of COTS software cost to above in-house software development
cost levels.  An additional issue associated with COTS software use was the lack of
pedigree.  Software not tested with a contractor’s components requires more, often
expensive and time consuming, testing.  Even with more testing, higher infant mortality
rates have been witnessed with COTS products
Automation:  The proper use of automation was, of course, an overarching theme.
Several comments were expressed about its benefits.  The overriding motivation was that
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autonomy is able to reduce operations costs.  It allows operations teams to be populated
by less skilled personnel.  It is easier to hire and adequately train these personnel.  The
automation should not be at the expense of reliability.  Virtually all interviewees,
mentioned, in one way or another, that system reliability was key to performance.  The
defense sector is motivated to maintain the correction operation of the system to assure it
is available when required.  The civil sector was motivated to not disrupt their revenue
stream.  Simple robust design was highlighted as the avenue to achieve this reliability.
Insofar as autonomy increases system reliability, it should be considered, but it can never
be at the expense of reduce system reliability.
Another comment about proper use of autonomy was focused on the spacecraft level of
design.  Autonomous capability should only be used when it is most critical, such as
attitude control or satellite formation maintenance.  Other systems do not realize the
savings from automation.  For example, a battery might fail over a 2-year timeframe.  It
is relatively easy for an operations team to plan for its replacement, if it is available on
board.  Automation, with its cost in software development and complexity, would not be
justifiable.
National Space Acquisition Policy
After decades of spacecraft development, there are few architectural decisions for
relatively simple satellites.  Small satellites, and many large satellites, fit relatively easily
into their respective organizations operational capabilities.  The acquisition of many
DoD space missions follow a different path due to their inherent complexity.  These
systems can benefit greatest from a top-level architectural analysis that includes an
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examination of the operations techniques.  Unfortunately, a number of political and
organizational barriers prevent this from smoothly occurring.  The following analysis
will review the key stakeholders in this policy environment, summarize the relevant
political environment, and provide recommendations for improved conceptual spacecraft
design.
Policy Stakeholders
Warfighter:  This broadly used ambiguous term refers to men and women closest to
combat.  These people deliver the weapons during war or play a first hand role in
carrying out tactical operations.  They are the ultimate user of defense space systems.
They sometimes use data directly from satellites, as in the signals from the Global
Positioning System constellation, or processed data from the Defense Support System
satellites that tells them the potential target for a Scud missile.  They have no concern
about the acquisition schedule or cost of the space assets; they only desire assurance that
when needed the space system will be working properly.
Air Force Space Command:  This is the major command that launches and operates a
majority of the nations satellites.  It supports the warfighter by providing weather,
communications, intelligence, missile warning, and navigation information and
capabilities.  The Directorate of Requirements (AFSPC/DR) has a large impact on future
space mission design.  It is charted to develop strategic technology roadmaps to evolve
current systems to meet future warfighter needs.  Specifically it develops and processes
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the appropriate requirements documents such as the Mission Needs Statement and
Operational Requirements Document. [AFSPCI10-120104, 1998]
Space and Missiles Systems Center:  This product center has been a part of the Air
Force Materiel Command and is the hub for the acquisition of Air Force launch vehicles
and spacecraft.  The Directorate of Developmental Planning (SMC/XR) coordinate new
technology and system development with the needs as stated by the user community.
SMC/XR, has the capability, with support from the Aerospace Corporation, to perform
architecture analyses to guide future space system development.  These efforts focus on
users needs 5 to 10 years into the future.  The mission solution analysis done in
SMC/XR and is translated back to AFSPC/ DR.
National Security Space Architect:  The NSSA is a joint DoD and Central Intelligence
Agency organization charted to study and recommend space architectures to achieve the
nations national security objectives.  Since it has a broad perspective, it is able to provide
guidance on which type of systems need to be explored with conceptual design efforts.
National Reconnaissance Office:  The NRO is an organization that has been cloaked in
secrecy for most of the past four decades.  It is responsible for developing, acquiring,
and operating the nation’s national security assets that acquire imagery and signals
intelligence from space platforms.  This organization has been culturally separated from
the Air Force units performing similar functions and has developed a reputation for fast
and efficient acquisition strategies.
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Aerospace Contractors:  The prime contractors for the defense space industry comprise
a small subset of the aerospace industry.  Companies such as Boeing and Lockheed
Martin work very closely with the acquisition organizations to develop conceptual space
system designs that meet needs stated by AFSPC.
Other Space Organizations:  There is, of course, a large list of organizations that
interact with the above entities to facilitate conceptual space mission development in the
Air Force.  NASA and NOAA have collaborated extensively with DoD on space
missions.  The user community goes beyond uniformed warfighters to the intelligence
community and even the public in the case of GPS.
Political Climate
The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, as the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, has
placed renewed emphasis on DoD space programs.  Two significant reports have been
released that foreshadowed structural changes to the national security space community.
The NRO Commission, in its November 2000 report, reiterated the successes of the
NRO and supported increased visibility of its programs to the President.  It advocated
the creation of new, highly secretive Office of Space Reconnaissance.  It recognized the
NRO’s evolving user community and the need for flexibility to meet both strategic and
tactical needs.  Above all else, this report emphasizes the NRO’s past accomplishments
and highlights its need to continue adapting to new situation.  In January 2001, the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
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Organization released the second and arguably more far-reaching report.  This
commission, that was until the final months lead by Donald Rumsfeld, recommended a
series of organizational changes for DoD and the NRO.  One recommendation was to
realign the Air Force and NRO space programs.  Since the release of the report,
Secretary Rumsfeld has appointed a single official within the Air Force with authority
over both Air Force and NRO space programs.  The National Security Space Architect
(NSSA) will also be realigned to report to the Under Secretary of the Air Force and
Director of the NRO.  [Space Commission Report, 2001, and Space Initiative News
Release, 2001]
Strategies for Improved Conceptual Design
The Space Commission Report calls for the “best practices” of the Air Force and the
NRO space organizations to be integrated together.  Identifying the “best practices” that
relate to space operations and conceptual design will guide the development of policy
recommendations for improved conceptual design.
Having high quality personnel available for conceptual design motivated the first policy
recommendation.  The Air Force and NRO developed in quite different environments
and have dissimilar cultures.  Because the NRO needed to remain behind a black veil,
transfer of personnel into and out of the organization was not as easy as in the Air Force.
As a result, the NRO encouraged rotation amongst specialty areas within specific
programs.  The Air Force personnel system encouraged its members to transfer between
bases and gain experience with a wide variety areas not necessarily focused on space
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systems, especially not on one particular space system.  Since the acquisition and
operational units were in different major commands, it was also difficult to transfer
between these two specialty areas.  Because of these dynamics, the NRO developed
personnel were highly knowledgeable about their space system.  The Air Force
personnel model developed personnel with a wider variety of experiences, but less
capable in each.  The conceptual design of space systems is most effective when the
designers have first hand experience with similar systems at all phases of the lifecycle.
The NRO model encouraged this and therefore has the experienced personnel for
conceptual design that considers not only the issues that typically surface before initial
operational capability (IOC) but also normal and “fly-out” operations, the whole
lifecycle.  Policy Recommendation #1 should facilitate the development of the required
expertise.
The second policy recommendation centers on the NRO’s tolerance for risk exposure.
From its inception, the NRO has encouraged the focused development of leap-ahead
technologies.  It has encouraged development efforts that by Air Force standards would
be too risky.  Although the recent trend has shifted towards evolutionary, as apposed to
revolutionary, technology development, this “best practice,” as demonstrated by the
NRO in years past would facilitate advance operations technology development.  This
risk exposure was tolerated because of the secrecy surrounding the programs.  The Air
Force culture, with far more program oversight, developed a “one strike, you’re out”
POLICY RECOMMENDATION #1:  Populate conceptual design teams with
personnel that understand all aspects of the system lifecycle.  Use the NRO model
to encourage this exposure.
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mentality.  Failure was not an acceptable solution, even if much was learned in the
process.  Paradigm breaking technologies, such as some proposed to automate spacecraft
should be developed to reduce system lifecycle costs, thus:
The final recommendation does not come from a “best practice,” because neither the Air
Force nor the NRO places sufficient priority on quantitatively analyzing system-level
space architectures.  The NRO and the Air Force have system engineering teams at the
program office, or equivalent, level.  The NSSA does do high-level architecture analysis,
but these results are focused on single architectures, a wide variety that quantitative
analysis facilitates.
Air Force and NRO leadership have been motivated to change their organizations.
Secretary Rumsfeld is driven by the results of the Space Commission and to a lesser
extent the NRO Commission and has empowered this leadership to change or merge the
respective organizations.  This opens a critical opportunity to implement the above
policy recommendations, in tune with many other far-reaching changes the Space
Commission recommended.  These strategies are key to implementing a conceptual
POLICY RECOMMENDATION #2:  Encourage a revolutionary concept design
mentality by minimizing the negative career impact of single failures.
POLICY RECOMMENDATION #3:  Empower a joint organization, lower than the
NSSA but above program office levels, that can quantitatively assess conceptual
space architectures and incubate potential solutions with more detailed design
studies.
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design process that effectively analyses system level trades to meet the needs of both the
defense and intelligence communities.
Summary
This chapter develops the framework for space architecture analysis.  The foundation for
the analysis is space systems engineering.  The interview provided key insight into the
current state of conceptual space mission design and highlighted the need for effort to
integrate operations earlier in the design process.  These results led to policy
recommendations for the national security space sector to best to leverage quantitative
conceptual space system analysis.
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What, Sir, would you make a ship sail against the wind and
currents by lighting a bonfire under her deck?  I pray you
excuse me.  I have no time to listen to such nonsense.
- Napoleon to Robert Fulton
Chapter 4:  Conceptual Architecture Analysis Processes
This chapter begins by laying the framework for the analytical analysis of space mission
architectures.  After a review of the motivations for such analysis, the historical
processes, and weaknesses thereof, are provided as a baseline for the process
exemplified in Chapter 6.
Conceptual Space Systems
A system concept can be defined as one of many engineering solutions that meets the
end user’s needs.  During the Concept Design Phase of a space system acquisition
process, many such concepts are developed.  The system boundaries and key interfaces
between components in the system are explored and specified.  Risk is identified and
quantified plus preliminary specifications are completed for each of these alternative
concepts.  A single design, or a small set of alternative designs, becomes the baseline for
the detailed design in the next phase of system lifecycle, the Detailed Design and
Integration Phase.  [IEEE 1220]  Figure 4-1, on the next page, depicts the Concept
Exploration Flow in a diagram adapted from Space Mission Analysis and Design [1999].
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Some system engineers advocate defining a single space system as a reference, or point
design.  The goal is not to narrow down the potential solutions, or tradespace, but to
allow a common framework for discussion and further analysis.  This reference,
however, may create cause unexpected consequences and many express concern that
defining this one solution too early in the concept exploration process will overly
constrain the eventual design solution.  Engineers, having devoted effort to the design of
a particular solution, can become reluctant to accept other, potentially better-optimized,
























Figure 4-1: Concept Exploration Flow
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creating a design legacy.  System engineers must strive to maintain an unbiased
perspective when choosing the globally optimum system design.
Motivation for Analytical Methods
An analytical method, which involves the construction of a parametric model, is
advantageous because it explicitly states, through the specific equations, the defining
relationships between parts of the system.  A quantitative method also maintains an open
tradespace, therefore alleviating some of the issues associated with a defining a point
solution too early.  Models provide a common baseline that is helpful when engineers
have conflicting views about the results.  The assumptions that define the relationships
and are debated but the actual relationships, because they are quantitatively defined in
the model, are not a point of contention.
GINA Methodology Overview
The Space Systems Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has done
significant work in the area of conceptual distributed satellite system design.  A major
effort has revolved around a systematic analysis process outlined by Dr. Graeme Shaw
[1999].  This methodology generalizes space systems and allows the adoption of the
metric parameters of information network theory.  Titled the Generalized Information
Network Analysis (GINA) Methodology, it provides the framework for parametric
analysis of multiple space architectures.  Specifically it abstracts space systems to
information networks, with associated source nodes and sink nodes that addresses the
demand for information transfer between them.  The initial product of the GINA method
is computer code that equates specific design characteristics with metrics that define the
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quality of service provided by the system.  There are four quality-of-service parameters:
isolation, information rate, integrity, and availability.
The quality-of-service parameters are key to understanding the application of the GINA
methodology.  Isolation characterizes the space system’s ability to distinguish and
identify multiple sources of information.  Using a space telescope as an example,
isolation refers to the optical resolution.  Information rate is defined as the speed at
which information is transferred over the system.  For a space system, this is simply the
telecommunications data rate.  Integrity characterizes the probably that the information
transferred through the system becomes corrupted or is based on an erroneous data
collection.  With the space telescope example, the integrity would be quantified as the
bit error rate.  The availability quality-of-service parameter is the instantaneous
probability that information is being transferred through the network.
The GINA methodology is a framework in which to analysis multiple space system
architectures but it fails to precisely define the architecture analysis process.  This
methodology as prescribed by Shaw is in the amorphous region between a model
algorithm and a design process.  GINA is notable in that it discourages premature “point
designs,” which, as stated above, may cause the design team to overlook more
innovative, elegant, or cost-effective design solutions.
In the case studies performed the GINA methodology (the conceptual design of a space-
based optical interferometry constellation, a space-based radar constellation, and a space
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operations architecture) the autonomy trades were exterior to the design space, i.e. the
level and type of autonomous control and operations were held constant.  Swartz’ thesis
[1997] predates GINA slightly but is relevant because it does offer a probabilistic model
of the effects of automation on system availability and costs, two key design metrics.
This study is, however, not prescriptive, and concludes with little guidance for a system
engineer in the conceptual phase of a space system design.  The integration of
autonomous control design choices into the systems engineering processes is incomplete
in the current literature.
Space Architecture Analysis Process
One of the primary objectives of the Space Systems, Policy, and Architecture Research
Consortium (SSPARC) is the development of a system engineering process that
parametrically compares multiple space architectures.  The GINA methodology was the
baseline for this process the author will refer to as the Space Architecture Analysis
Process (SAAP).
Realizing that the process can only be developed iteratively, the SSPARC members have
used multiple design exercises to understand the interaction of the space system
engineers with the customer(s) and each other.  These multiple iterations have been
focused on the development of an ionospheric mapping satellite system or Terrestrial
Observer Swarm (TOS).  The different iterations are distinguished by affixing alphabetic
prefixes: A-TOS, B-TOS, etc.  The first design exercise, A-TOS, was performed by a
concentrated team of approximately seven members, including the author, during the fall
and winter of 2000.  Since no one on the design team was a subject expert in ionosphere
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sensing, but effort was devoted to understanding the issues associated with designing a
space system with this objective.  Close interaction with the Air Force Research
Laboratory (specifically, AFRL/VSB, the Battlespace Environment Division of the
Space Vehicles Directorate at Hanscom AFB, MA) helped the team understand the
issues.  Personnel from AFRL/VSB served as the customer for this science mission.  The
A-TOS team chose to use in situ instrumentation and performed architecture studies for
the conceptual design of such a space system.
The second design exercise, B-TOS, used a slightly larger team (besides the author, only
one other member was also in A-TOS team) and a different ionosphere instrumentation
technique.  The lessons learned from A-TOS were incorporated into an updated design
process.  The use of a multi-attribute utility analysis was the major addition to the B-
TOS process.  The remainder of this chapter will focus on a prescriptive design process
very similar to that used in B-TOS but incorporating many lessons learned.  The
significant differences will be noted.  Chapter 6 contains more specific information
about B-TOS, including results.
SAAP Phase I:  Understand Needs
SAAP is depicted in Figure 4-2 on the following page.  The process is divided into three
phases.  The goal for Phase I is to understand the user needs.  The design team and user
representatives are two of the key stakeholders, or people that are affected by the process
results.  After the design team identifies all relevant stakeholders, each group needs to
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Figure 4-2:  Space Architecture Analysis Process
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stakeholder will provide to the analysis effort and explicitly state the desired outcomes
and why those are useful to that particular stakeholder.  This process structures the
approach to the design effort and facilitates the subsequent scope negotiations by
ensuring each stakeholder understand the desires and motivations of the others.  The
customer, by interpreting the needs of the user and external systems, will provide the
constraints for the space system design.  These could include cost limitations, risk
tolerance, or any legacy systems that might need to be incorporated into the new design.
The constraints could also include specific design characteristics that narrow the design
tradespace to reduce the analysis scope.
The customer also provides the top-level space system objectives.  This is the broadest
level of tradespace reduction.  It could specific a space system over a ground or aerial
system, but not necessarily.  As there could be multiple approaches to fulfilling the
objectives, these need to be specific enough so that one model can realistically include
the tradespace.  As an example, the ionosphere mapping mission can be accomplished
using in situ measurements (A-TOS), top-side sounding measurements (B-TOS),
ground-based beacon measurement (B-TOS), GPS occulation, or UV radiation detection.
The particular techniques are not of interest here but specifying an in situ instrument
verses a sounding instrument changes the space system so drastically that, in the
SSPARC design efforts, the team decided to focus on modeling one at a time and not
concurrently.   The customer and design team must understand their capabilities.  The
customer is required to interact, often rather closely, with the design team at various
stages in the process.  The design team, will need to understand its skill and resource
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limitations to meet an agreed upon schedule and cost with the specified level of model
fidelity.  The relative priority can be captured using a chart similar to Table 4-1.
Table 4-1:  Project Priority Matrix





Defining and agreeing upon these priorities early provides guidance for the effort when
the inevitable conflicts arise.
Arguably, the most critical part of this analysis process is the correct selection of utility
attributes.  These attributes serve as a metric for mission performance as defined by the
customer.  In very precise form, they describe what the system should accomplish; but
they are not single goals, rather they are ranges of values.  Since the customer will most
likely not be familiar with this process, and not have a well defined set of attributes
available.  The attribute selection process should be iterative with the design team
remaining flexible.
Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis
It is at this point in the process that the design team should introduce the multi-attribute
utility analysis (MAUA) method to the customer.  The MAUA provides a systematic
technique for assessing customer “value”, in the form of preferences for the attributes.
The value of an architecture will, using the utility analysis, be translated into a utility
metric.  The utility metric, the product of the MAUA method, is measured on a scale
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between zero and one.  Each architecture can have different level of utility and,
combined with architecture lifecycle cost estimates, will provide the distinguishing
metric for architecture selection.  The customer preferences are quantified after a very
structured interview.  Since this interview, and subsequent analysis, requires
considerable effort, the attributes must be well defined and understood by both the
design team and customer beforehand.  In order to facilitate defining the attributes, the
design team should accomplish an initial utility interview with the customer.
The multi-attribute utility analysis is helpful because it provides visibility into the
architecture selection process by quantifying the otherwise qualitative value of each
architecture into a single score.  The single score eliminates the difficult task of
determining weights for different attributes.  It is an iterative process so it facilitates the
capture of decision rationale.  Since architecture value is a focus of the interview
process, it provides a good mechanism to concentrate on the important design issues and
weed out the irrelevant.
The MAUA does, however, require considerable time commitment by the customer.
Representatives on the design team must understand the utility process well and be able
to adequately guide the interview and discussions.  Finally, the architecture selection can
be highly sensitive to the relative weighing factors that govern the utility function.  Care
must be taken to educate the customer on these sensitivities and to correctly identify and
capture the customer’s values.  (The reader is referred to Richard de Neufville’s book,
Applied System Analysis, for further details about the MAUA process.)
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Following initial selection of the utility attributes, a notional system diagram should be
drawn to capture the boundaries of the analysis effort and to aid the team in visualizing
how components in the system might be integrated to fulfill the space mission
objectives.
SAAP Phase II:  Model the System
The goal of the second phase of SAAP is to model the space system to the previously
agreed upon level of fidelity.  The first step in this process is to understand how the
attributes will be calculated.  Since this process inevitably involves questions about how
the attributes are defined, these definitions must be verified with the customer.  After
specific algorithms for the attributes are established and, depending on the involvement
and expertise of the customer, approved, the models can be coded in a suitable
programming environment.  (The SSPARC efforts used Matlab and Analytical Graphics’
Satellite Took Kit.)
The design team should formally interview the customer to generate the utility function
after the attributes are solidified.  The utility function can then be calculated and
integrated into the code that, until then, could only produce attribute and cost data.  This
integrated code should be benchmarked against current space system to validate its
accuracy.  A sensitivity analysis should be performed to identify which constants have
the most influence on the model results.  The value of the most sensitive constants
should be known with a high degree of certainly.
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The model will have a large set of constants used to define the relationships that produce
the attribute and cost outputs.  At this point, the team should choose a subset of constants
that will be varied to understand the most significant architecture tradeoffs.  (During the
B-TOS effort, these architecture variables were selected before the attribute variables
were well defined and understood.  They became a distraction during the code
development.  The model was focused on incorporating the architecture variables when
the focus should have remained on accurately calculating the attributes.)  The
architecture variables can be selected using the Quality Function Deployment techniques
in an effort to relate the candidate variables with the attributes.  The variables that are
determined to have to most significant impact on the attributes should be selected.  Each
possible combination of variables will define the characteristics of each architecture in
the analysis.  The design team must attempt to reduce the architecture variables to the
smallest set possible while not inadvertently disregarding important tradeoffs.  Since
these define the tradespace, each additional architecture variable adds another dimension
to the tradespace.  (The B-TOS effort had 12 architecture variables, but three were not
traded due to premature, and therefore inaccurate, variable selection.)  Figure 4-2 is a
diagram of the information flow through the model structure.
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SAAP Phase III:  Evaluate Architectures
After the model has been coded and verified and the architecture variables selected, the
utility and cost values for each architecture of interest can be calculated.  The
enumeration of the tradespace is governed, as mentioned above, by the architecture
variables, but also by the desired resolution of the tradespace.  Some architecture
variables might be simply defined as Boolean selections or choices among a small set of
potential values.  The variables that are continuous, such as orbit altitude, must be
carefully divided into reasonable sections, however.  The granularity of these divisions
will define the resolution of the tradespace.
The optimal architectures will those that produce the highest utility for the lower cost.  A
frontier of architecture can be defined as the boundary of available optimal architectures.
After the frontier architectures are identified, they should be translated into the
















Figure 4-3: Model Information Flow
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and constraints.  Each architecture on the frontier is “equally good” but other factors,
such as cost ceilings, can be used to select single or small set of architectures for further
study.
Summary
This process creates a means to analyze conceptual space system architectures.  The
focus of this research is on using this process to understand how modern approaches to
space operations, specifically intelligent command and control technology, impact the
selection of optimal space architectures.  Before the implementation of this process can
be explained, it is necessary to explore the technology that will make this possible.  This
topic is discussed in the subsequent chapter.
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It is impossible that man should not be a part of nature, or that
he should not follow her general order.
- Spinoza
Chapter 5:  Space System Autonomy
This chapter serves as an introduction to the technology domain, autonomous space
systems.  The first objective is to provide a clear description of autonomy, then to briefly
introduce the field of intelligent agents, on which autonomy is deeply dependent.  The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the impact autonomous control is having on the
design of space systems plus a review of the impediments of integrating autonomous
control into space systems.
Autonomy: A Definition
This definition is sufficient for many situations but falls short when describing the
motivation of many complex system designers.  The concept of complex engineering
au·ton·o·my
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural -mies
Date: circa 1623
1 : the quality or state of being self-governing; especially : the right of self-
government
2 : self-directing freedom and especially moral independence
3 : a self-governing state
Source:  Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary
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system autonomy is a child of the computer and information revolutions.  The massive
processing of data made possible with computers enables them to self-governing.  An
explicit distinction between autonomy and automation is often difficult.  Sheridan
defines automation as “the automatically controlled operation of an apparatus, a process,
or a system by mechanical or electronic devices that take place of human organs of
observation, decision, and effort” [1992].  Bradshaw provides a more exact definition of
autonomy in the context of artificial intelligence
The idea that an autonomous system can operate without user intervention is paramount
to discussion throughout this thesis.  Care must be taken, however, to describe how
much autonomy is granted to a system, or rather the extent of its allowed self-governing
and regulating behavior.  A continuum exists that describes how much autonomy is
integrated into a system, but Martin and Barber focus on the four discrete autonomy
levels for goal-oriented behavior shown in Table 5-1 [1996a].
Table 5-1:  Goal-Oriented Autonomy [Martin and Barber, 1996a]
Level of Autonomy Description
Command Driven A control system does not plan for the goal and must obey orders
given by others
Consensus A control system works as a team member to devise plans with
other control systems
Locally Autonomous A control system plans for the goal alone, unconstrained by other
control systems
Master A control system devises plans for the goal and the goals of its
followers who are command-driven for those goals
These levels of autonomy allow for adaptation by a system.  One situation might dictate
acting as a follower while another circumstance may enable the system to act as a Master
Autonomy:  Goal-directedness, proactive, and self-starting behavior
[Bradshaw, 1997]
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over other systems.  This flexibility allows different tasks or goals of a system to be
assigned different levels of autonomy.  Since electromechanical systems have multiple
goals of varying complexity, this creates a situation in which the system is operating
under multiple, simultaneous levels of autonomy.
The loosely defined levels of autonomy in Table 5-1 have been formalized and modeled
computationally by Martin and Barber to assess the flexibility and adaptability inherent
in a control system capable of multiple levels of autonomy [1996a].  As will be shown in
the next chapter, the control system framework is too restrictive a perspective for use in
this research, but the autonomy level metrics (constructs) are of interest.
These four autonomy constructs are responsibility, commitment, authority, and
independence.  The responsibility construct maps closely to the autonomy levels given in
Table 5-1.  It is a measure of how much a control system must plan to see a goal
attained.  More responsibility equates to more complicated planning and often a more
complex interaction between the control system and other systems.  The commitment
measure allows a control system to determine the relative cost of not achieving a goal.  It
has been quantified to four values: low, medium, high, and complete.  Authority
measures the control systems ability to access resources.  Control system authority is
derived from its knowledge of how system resources are managed and can it can gain
access to desired resources.  The final autonomy construct, independence, is a measure
of how freely a control system can plan.  A high level of independence implies
selfishness; a control system has the ability to overcome system constraints and
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disregard its impact on other systems.  Low independence forces predictable behavior of
the control system.  The four levels of autonomy from Table 5-1 are each given a value
for independence:  Command Driven, 1; Consensus, 2; Master, 3; and Locally
Autonomous, 4. [1996a]
Antsaklis and Passino differentiate the degrees of autonomy of intelligent control
systems into three levels: low, medium, and high.  A conventional fixed controller,
which can tolerate a restricted class of parameter variations and disturbances, has a low
degree of autonomy.  A conventional adaptive control equates to the medium degree of
autonomy.  A high level of autonomy describes a controller with the ability to
accommodate for system failures. [1993]
These concepts of autonomy levels are within the framework of a control system’s
organizational architecture and capability, not of the electromechanical system it
controls.  A holistic set of autonomy levels, one that is intended for entire space systems,
will be investigated in subsequent sections of this chapter, but first it is useful to
investigate the en vogue technique to instantiate an intelligent control system.
Autonomy and Intelligent Agents
Autonomy is the objective, and intelligent agents are one way to achieve it.
Adapted from [Antsaklis and Passino, 1993]
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The above paragraphs used “control system” in the generic sense to separate the
concepts of autonomy from the underlying control intelligence.  A significant portion of
the current research in the area of intelligence control systems revolves around software
agents.  Agents are software and robotic entities that are capable of independent action in
unpredictable, often real-time, environments.  They are heralded as one of the most
important and exciting areas of computer science.  [Sierra, et al., 2000]
Bradshaw [1997] provides multiple perspectives on the definition of a software agent,
but the most accessible seems to be from Weiss [1999].
Agent architectures have been applied to a truly diverse set of domains.  Some examples
include interactive cinema, information mining, user interfaces, electronic commerce
and negotiation, industrial process control, and autonomous vehicles [Sierra, et al.,
2000].  It is, of course, the last example that is the motivation for this research.
Agents are autonomous, but autonomy is only a subset of a software agent’s traits.
Table 5-2, adapted from Khosla and Dillon, 1997, and Knapik, 1998, lists the common
characteristics of software agents.
An agent is a computational entity that can be viewed as perceiving and
acting upon its environment and that is autonomous in that its behavior
at least partially depends on its own experience.
[Weiss, 1999]
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Table 5-2:  Software Agent Characteristics [Khosla and Dillon, 1997, and Knapik, 1998]
Autonomy Agents take initiative and exercise a non-trivial degree control over
their own actions
Collaboration Agents exchange information to improve the quality of collective
decision making and obtain information to help accomplish goals
Reactivity Agents perceive their environment and dynamically choose which
actions to invoke, and in what sequence, to respond
Temporal History Agents record their beliefs and internal states for reference to revise
previous decisions when new data is available




Agents have the constructs to properly model structural and relational
aspects of the problem domain and its environment
Distributed Operation Agents are capable of being distributed across systems to
accomplish its goals
Implications of Autonomy to Space Mission Design
The desire to increase the level of autonomy of traditional space systems is motivated by
three objectives, as described in Bernard, et al, 1998: to take advantage of unique
mission opportunities, to reduce spacecraft operations costs, and to handle uncertainty.
The flexibility and awareness that agents give space systems allow them to recognize
and use unforeseen opportunities.  In a space science mission example, an agent may
identify an unusual event in the collected data and gather more detailed data to further
characterize the situation.  An agent on a communication satellite could recognize the
traffic patterns of different sources and optimize the allocated bandwidth to each.
The reduction of space operations costs is a key benefit of increased autonomy.  Many
space systems, especially the defense systems vital to national security, have an
extensive ground support team.  This team is very expensive to maintain and defense
systems are seeing budgetary pressure to reduce operations costs.  For science missions,
reduced operations costs often directly translate into longer missions and therefore more
science return on the investment of building and launching the satellite.  The commercial
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space community can also see a directly quantifiable gain from reducing space
operations cost; the money saved becomes profit.  [Lewin, 1998]
The application of autonomous agents to handle uncertainty is a natural outgrown of the
most common use of autonomy on-board spacecraft today: fault protection system.
Even the most rudimentary spacecraft employ multiple strings of components and,
usually a very deterministic, means to transfer the use from one string to another.  With
agents controlling, fault diagnosis then becomes a search for likely diagnoses given
observed symptoms [Bernard, et al, 1998].
Employing intelligence agents, or simpler forms of autonomy, requires more
development time to build and test the flight software.  Estimations of this increased cost
is hardly easy to quantify and some researchers believe it is virtually impossible to
predict the cost or time required for flight software development [Leveson, 1999].
The Department of Defense realized the complexity of developing flight software first
hand during the development of the Redundancy Management (RM) subsystem on its
MILSTAR secure communication satellite system in the late 1980’s.  The primary intent
of the RM subsystem was to be an automated fault diagnosis and switching mechanism,
with “a degree of performance beyond any level previously attempted,” that allows the
spacecraft to continue operation without the need for ground controller intervention [202
Course, 1996].  The driver for this requirement was satellite survivability and the need
for continued mission operations during a global war that might see the loss of ground
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operation facilities.  After the end of the Cold War the requirement for survivability
become less vital and since developers had struggled to find means to operationally test
the entire specific fault processing algorithms, the RM subsystem is only activated for
anomalies that are immediate threats to spacecraft life or can cause irreversible damage
[Elkins, 2000].
At the opposite end of the complexity spectrum from MILSTAR, many space systems
have seen tangible benefits from implementing autonomous operational schemes.  The
Orbview-1 spacecraft is an example of a simple scientific satellite that automated much
of the operations and ground support processes, with a realizable reduction in operating
costs and fewer scheduling and operational errors.  This 68 kg spacecraft regularly
downlinked science instrument and satellite state of health data autonomously
[Kennison, 1997].
The Deep Space 1 spacecraft and its Remote Agent Experiment (RAX) successfully
demonstrated the use of autonomous agents on spacecraft in May, 1999.  The spacecraft
was sent a list of goals instead of the typical specific command sequence and, despite
some minor glitches, achieved 100% of its validation goals.  The approach taken by the
Remote Agent Experiment design team was complicated since the RAX software was
installed above the normal flight software.  This required the remote agent to process
larger amounts of software, and be very intelligent.  As a result, the original mission
objectives were reduced and conventional Mars Pathfinder software was substituted for
remote agent complexity.  [Havelund, 2000, and Dornheim, 1998]
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In May of 2001, NASA’s EO-1 spacecraft successfully demonstrated autonomous
formation control by staying one minute behind the Landsat-7 satellite.  The science
motivation for this capability was to overfly the exact terrain observed from the Landsat
but the feat also demonstrates the capability of the autonomous formation control
algorithms. [Morring, 2001]
Autonomous control and operation in traditional satellite systems has been a
performance enhancer, but autonomous agents are an enabling technology to host of
more complicated missions that have multiple satellites operating in parallel.  A number
of distributed satellite systems are being designed that would require a higher level of
satellite self-governance simply due to the number in the constellation.  A key challenge
to efficient operations is the large number of satellite contacts each day.  With
constellations of 50 to 100 satellites in development, the ability to oversee each
spacecraft individually is lost and autonomous systems are a requirement for efficient
operations.  Coordination is required across multiple disciplines such as mission
planning and scheduling, pre- and post-pass reconfiguration, routine satellite monitoring,
off-line analysis, flight dynamics, and data capture [Truszkowski, et al., 2000].
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The agent architecture required to support command and control of complex constellations
of satellites is conceptualized in Figure 5-1.  Potential coordination architectures for the
spacecraft-level agents (the manager/facilitator in Figure 1) has been described by Barrett
[1999] and  Schetter, et al. [2000].  Schetter, et al., describe four levels of agent intelligence.
The lowest level, I4, the spacecraft-level agent is only responsible for receiving and
executing plans or goals.  The I3 level includes local planning and the agent is capable of
generating and executing plans related to its own tasks.  Cluster, or constellation, knowledge
appears in I2.  This level is characterized by spacecraft-level agent local planning in
conjunction with whole or partial cluster knowledge.  Cluster level planning is the highest
level of intelligence, I1.  The spacecraft-level agents have full cluster knowledge, interact,























Figure 5-1: Distributed Agent Concept (Adapted from Johnson, et al., 1999)
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Barrett approaches agent architecture from a perspective similar to Martin and Barber
[1996a] in Table 5-1.  His three autonomy architectures are master/slave coordination,
teamwork, and peer-to-peer coordination.  In the master/slave coordination scenario one
spacecraft-level agent directly controls the others as if they were connected.  The
“master” spacecraft performs all autonomy reasoning and dictates these to other
spacecraft with no agents.  This is inherently challenging since virtually continuous
communication between the spacecraft is required.  The teamwork architecture seeks to
reduce the communication dependency by giving spacecraft an executive
(manager/facilitator) agent.  A team leader and follower hierarchy is still in place for
dissemination of plans and constellation orchestration.  The peer-to-peer coordination
scheme completely distributes the constellation planning process and provides multiple
levels of redundancy.  In order to handle the increased agent capability, each satellite is,
unfortunately, more complex and costly.  [1999]
Barriers to Space System Autonomy
There are significant barriers to implementing high levels of autonomy in the form of
autonomous agents.  In many respects, the technical challenges may be the easiest to
overcome.  As alluded to in the above MILSTAR example the software development
costs and adequate testing are not trivial issues for the integration of autonomous
functionality.   Zetocha [1998] reviewed the impediments to implementing autonomy.
The impediments are listed with little modification in Table 5-3.
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Table 5-3:  Impediments to Satellite Autonomy [Zetocha, 1998]
Risk Aversion Many believe it is too risky to let an orbiting satellite make
its own complex decisions
Loss of Control Operators/engineers fear an inability to control the actions
of an autonomous satellite
Cost Autonomous software development seems too costly when
compared to ops personnel
Testing Difficulty Autonomous flight software is difficult to verify and validate
Proprietary Data Concerns Satellite manufacturers are reluctant to release proprietary
info to AI software developers
Threat to Jobs Ground automation is evaluated by operations personnel
who feel their positions will be rendered obsolete
Threat to Prestige Ground facility supervisors derive their prestige from the
number of people, rather than the number of computers, in
an operations center
Inadequate Quantitative Analysis A quantitative analysis of the benefits of autonomy has
never been performed
Limited Immediate Impact Current operational satellites will receive minimal benefit
from autonomous ground software
Although Zetocha offers counterarguments to each of the above impediments, a review
of the DoD space community offers more insight into why programs have a difficult
time implementing autonomy.  The DoD space operations centers have very strong
institutional momentum.  They are not inclined to change their well laid out operation
schemes.  Fiscal pressure is significant but a reluctance to trust agents with space assets
vital to our national security is also pervasive.  Reluctance in the higher echelons to
replace the active-duty personnel with autonomy increasing technology may be a
defensive measure to maintain their organizational stature or due to a fear of new
technology.
The same issues can be seen in the commercial and civil (science) programs, but to a
lesser extent.  Commercial systems are less risk adverse; realizing that time to market is
often key to market capture, commercial companies will take larger technology risks.
The availability of civil space systems, since they are not critical to national security, is
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less of a concern.  The civil programs are also less complex and oftentimes easier
platforms on which to integrate new technology.  (This discussion excludes
interplanetary missions, since latency issues often prescribe an autonomous capability.)
Summary
Autonomous agent technology is gaining wider acceptance as agents are integrated into
less challenging areas that space system control.  Agents have proven successful on orbit
and development of agents for large distributed satellite systems is occurring.  The
minimum level of autonomy of some planned satellite constellations far surpasses the
level found on current systems.  Barriers to implementing autonomy are significant but
not insurmountable, especially considering the speed at which other information
technologies have integrated themselves into engineering toolsets or general society.
The next chapter will exemplify how this technology and reduce the cost of space
missions and enable large, complex space systems.
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You'll never plow a field by turning it over in your mind.
- Irish Proverb
Chapter 6:  Model Development and B-TOS Case Analysis
This chapter serves a vital part in this thesis.  It reviews previous work done on a space
mission design, B-TOS, then reviews the development of a autonomy and complexity
metric that is then integrated into the model.  The resulting architecture tradespace is
then analyzed.
B-TOS Overview
The general purpose of the B-TOS mission is to characterize the structure of the
ionosphere using topside sounding.  The topside sounding is conducted from a space-
based platform.  The conceptual development of that optimal platform and the systems
that support it is the purpose of the B-TOS analysis.  Once the ionospheric data is
collected by the system, it will be sent to AFRL’s forecasting model to provide
ionosphere weather predictions for a variety of science and military users.
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Motivation for Ionospheric Forecasting
The ionosphere is the region of the Earth’s atmosphere in which solar energy causes
photoionization.  This causes growth in the ionosphere during the day but, because of
low gas densities, the recombination of ions and electrons proceeds slowly at night.  It
has a lower altitude limit of approximately 50-70 km, a peak near 300 km altitude, and
no distinct upper limit.
The diurnal variation of the ionosphere directly impacts the propagation of radio waves
through the ionosphere.  The climatology of the ionosphere is well known, but the daily
ionosphere weather, and therefore the effects on radio communication, currently evades
prediction.  Depending on transmission frequency, the impacts can range from phase and
amplitude variations to significant refraction and scintillation.  These effects can cause
loss of GPS lock, satellite communication outages, ground to space radar interference
and errors, and HR radio outages.  The turbulence in the ionosphere is often
concentrated around the magnetic equator, so the radio propagation errors are most
common around the equator.
Ionospheric Measurement Techniques
There are a number of techniques available to measure the relevant parameters of the
ionosphere.  Ground-based ionosondes are a common technique employed today but
they only measure the electron density profile only up to the region of peak density (the








Figure 6-1: Ionosphere Measurement Techniques
The first potential technique involves detection of the ultraviolet radiation emitted by
ionospheric disturbances.  Viewing the UV radiation on the night side is much less
complicated than on the dayside and experts debate whether useable dayside
measurements can be made.  GPS occultation involves the measurement of dual GPS
signals to provide data to calculate a horizontal measurement of the total electron content
between the receiving satellite and rising and setting GPS satellites.  This orientation is
significant because a horizontal slice of the ionosphere is more homogeneous than a
vertical slice.  A variety of instruments can gather ion and neutral velocity data while in
situ.  Combining this data with electric field and plasma density, also done in situ, has
the potential to provide sufficient data for forecasting models.  Ground based receivers
are also used to measure radio wave scintillation and therefore ionosphere variability.
The final measurement technique, topside sounding as represented in the center of
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Figure 8-1, relies on spacecraft orbiting above the ionosphere.  It acts similar to an
ionosonde, but collects electron density profile data, as can be implied, from the topside
of the ionosphere.  Since ionosphere variability often results in disturbances rising above
the peak density region, a topside sounder has the potential to collect very valuable
forecasting data.
B-TOS Payload Instruments
The payload on the B-TOS satellites has a combination of the aforementioned
instrument types.  The primary payload is a topside sounder that measures the electron
density profile (EDP) between the satellites altitude and the peak density region by
cycling through a series of frequencies and timing the reflection from the ionosphere.
This instrument is also capable of collecting total electron content data in the nadir
direction by measuring radio wave reflection off the surface of the earth.  The second
instrument in the B-TOS payload measures signals propagated through the ionosphere
from ground-based beacons.  The ionosphere’s refractive index can be calculated by
comparing the true angle between nadir and the beacon’s location with the measured
value.  The third ionosphere-measuring technique, used in conjunction with other
satellites in the B-TOS swarm, is able to measure off-nadir turbulence in the ionosphere.
Knowledge about the small-scale structure is valuable for scintillation prediction models.
Additionally, each of the satellites within the swarm must be capable of housing a
special black box payload.  Designated payload “B,” the design team has no information
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about this payload, other than what is necessary for sufficient integration into the rest of
the satellite.
B-TOS Model Structure
The B-TOS space system model consists of approximately 23 modules.  A simplified
version of the information flow through the model structure is depicted in Figure 6-2.
The functions of these major modules include the following:
·  Swarm: Calls on the spacecraft module to define the spacecraft parameters for
the entire swarm
·  Reliability: Determines probability that a particular number of satellites are
operational in any swarm at a given time
·  Time: Determines mission, accuracy, and latency values









Figure 6-2:  B-TOS Space System Model Structure
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·  Launch: Selects lowest cost launch vehicle that can deploy all satellites in a
single swarm in a single launch
·  Operations: Calculates operations personnel and facilities costs
·  Attributes: Calculates value of 6 attributes for utility function
·  Costing: Tabulates spacecraft, operations, launch, and program level costs plus
incorporates learning curve for different spacecraft types
B-TOS Results and Sensitivities
The baseline B-TOS code is capable of analyzing variable orbital geometries, multiple
swarm size and density options, and spacecraft of individually varying functionality.
As described in Chapter 4, the output from the code is not a single optimized
architecture.  Instead, the current model outputs a focused tradespace.  It does not
specify single-point architecture, but gives the cost and utility of each of the input
architectures.
Table 6-1 lists the major trades that define the enumerated tradespace.  The different
architecture variables were chosen because they had a large impact on the utility
attributes.
Table 6-1:  Baseline Enumeration Matrix
Design Vector Variable Chosen Enumeration Values
Circular orbit altitude (km) 1100, 1300
Number of Planes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Number of Swarms/Plane 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Number of Satellites/Swarm 4, 7, 10, 13
Radius of Swarm (km) 0.18, 1.5, 8.75, 50




This enumeration resulted in 4000 architectures for analysis.  (An additional set of 33
architectures were captured for a total of 4033.)  Making prudent choices on the orbital
radius proved to be one of the more complicated tasks of the enumeration.  As shown in
the above table, the selected radii are not completely intuitive.  The selection process
was iterative and driven by the maximum desired accuracy specified by the customer.
The maximum baseline to achieve best accuracy was determined to drive the selection of
the outer-ring to 50 km.  The minimum baseline, driven by the frequency of the beacons,
was calculated to no less than 176 m, therefore 180 m was the smallest ring used.  Figure
6-3 shows a notional 10-satellite swarm configuration.







The third level of the architecture variables adjusts the functionality of each individual
spacecraft.  While the code has the capacity to create a separate functionality
combination for each spacecraft in the swarm, the enumerations focused on
functionalities of a mothership in the center of the swarm surrounded by a number of
daughterships in the surrounding swarm sub-orbits.  This enumeration considered five
different functionality studies show in the Table 6-2.
Table 6-2:  Configuration Studies Matrix
In Table 6-2, there are five configuration studies listed with two different spacecraft
types: a mothership (M) and a daughtership (D). The last four rows of the first column of
the above figure list the spacecraft-level design variables.  The payload (Tx/Rx) refers to
the capacity of the payload to sound (ping the ionosphere) or to receive the reflected
signals off of the ionosphere.  Spacecraft with processing are capable of compressing the
data.  The TDRSS link is the spacecraft’s long-range communication capacity to send
information from the swarm to the surface via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS).  Finally, the intra-swarm link refers to the spacecraft’s short-range
communication systems, sending information to other spacecraft in the same swarm.
Study 
Type M D M D M D M D M D 
Number 4+ 0 1 3+ 1 3+ 1 3+ 1 3+ 
Payload (Tx) Yes n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Payload (Rx) Yes n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Processing Yes n/a Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
TDRSS Link  Yes n/a Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Intra-Swarm Link No n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Figure 6-4 displays the most significant tradespace region from the baseline B-TOS data.
The architecture utility is plotted against total lifecycle cost for a 5-year mission.  The
horizontal banding is a result of swarm radius architecture grouping.   Stated another
way, the swarm radius has a very significant impact on utility and changing other
architecture variables, such as the number of swarms per plane or the number of planes
in the constellation, serves only to increase cost more than increasing utility.  The
optimal architectures, depicted as the points on the left and top of the figure, are defined
by increasing the swarm radius before adding new swarms.  More specifically the
frontier architectures are all one-swarm constellations with configuration study #5.  This
configuration includes a mothership that communicates with the ground and processes
the payload data.  The daughterships, in this scenario, only collect payload data and
transmit it to the mothership.  These frontier architectures are the focus of the updated
















Figure 6-4: B-TOS Tradespace
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The baseline model produces the unique results visible in Figure 6-5.  The operations
model calculated the labor and facility costs based on the number of motherships with
which the operations center must communicate.  This, essentially, ignored the
daughterships, or rather assumed there was sufficient on-board autonomy to account for
operating the daughterships.  As a result, Figure 6-5 shows two distinct rates of
operations cost growth.  The bottom set of architectures, accounts for configuration #1,
the case where each spacecraft acts as a mothership and communications with the
ground.   As can be seen, the operations cost grow very rapidly and exceed $1 billion for
the five-year mission when operating less than 50 spacecraft.  The remainder of the
points, those forming the upper group, account for the daughterships being “blind” to the
operations center.  This is the opposite extreme; the operations cost do not account for

































tradespace between the regions motivated the inclusion of the autonomy/complexity
model that is introduced below.
Additional Model Functionality
The implementation of the autonomy/complexity model required the addition of a new
module to the B-TOS code.  This complexity module incorporated the mission planning,
space segment, ground segment, and risk avoidance complexity metrics.  Figure 6-6 is
the updated model information flow diagram.  The complexity module inputs only the
constants and architecture variables and, since the complexity vector only measures
operational complexity, as opposed to spacecraft or system level complexity, it only
impacts the operations module.  The autonomy levels, as described below, were also
integrated into the architecture vectors.











Carraway’s Operations Complexity Model
John Carraway, an engineer at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, developed a complexity
metric the measures the operational complexity of a space system.  Quantifying this
complexity gives a system engineer a nondimentional scaling factor that can be used to
adjust the predict costs to operate a space mission.  This in turn helps identify the trades
to reduce operations costs, and provides a parametric model that can be integrated into
the SAAP process.  Cost-Effective Space Mission Operations is a multiauthor book that
has a chapter devoted to this complexity metric.  If the reader would like more
information about this metric than what is provided below, chapter 6 of that book should
be referenced. [Boden, 1996].
Operational complexity is defined by 95 metrics that account for a variety of influence
on space operations.  These 95 metrics are divided into four categories:  mission design
and planning, flight system, ground system, and risk avoidance.  Each of the 95 metrics
can have a value of low, medium, or high.  Figure 6-7 shows the calculations in block



























Figure 6-7:  Operations Complexity Block Diagram
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factor.  Knowing the mission type and mission phase produced a “normalized”
workforce level.  This level is adjusted by each of the scaling factor and category
combinations to produce an adjusted total personnel value.  This model was verified
against 14 NASA missions and predicts the actual mission workforce, with one
exception, to within 25%.
The complexity metric is integrated into the operations models as depicted in Figure 6-8.
The operations model calculates the expected number of labor hours required to operate
the satellites.  This value replaces the look-up table as the input to the block diagram in
Figure 6-7.
The outputs from the operations module are a series of cost structures that integrate into
the costing module.  In addition, the operations module produces a matrix of labor
statistics useful for quantifying the size and ability of the operations workforce.  The





























Figure 6-8: Complexity Metric Integrated into Operations Model
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Table 6-3:  Labor Matrix Output
Row (labor type) Column (labor data)
Controllers Pay Rate ($/hr)
Engineers Turnover Rate (fte/yr)
Support Training Time (hrs)
Orbit Analysts Post-launch Checkout Daily Work (hrs/day)
Mission Planners Normal Operations Daily Work (hrs/day)
Trainers Annualized Cost ($/yr)
Managers Total Labor Cost ($)
Overhead
This module calculates the cost of operations but using spacecraft quantity and reliability
data to size the required workforce.  Learning curves are used on each of the seven
different types of personnel to account for increasing personnel capability as the
operations team gains experience throughout the mission lifetime.  The cost of the
required facilities is calculated, while segregating the startup and reoccurring expenses.
The output variables are sums of different components of these cost structures.
The fundamental premise for the simplifications in this module is that labor costs
account for the far majority of operations costs for a space system.  Facility and
computers costs are included but the modeling accuracy emphasis remains on the labor
calculations.  In addition, the operations center cost model assumes an entirely new
center must be constructed with a devoted operations staff.  In reality, operations
facilities would probably be acquired from previous space missions, and operations
personnel might migrate between multiple space missions.  Since this dynamic would be
challenging to model accurately, and since it the results we be very specific to the
organization that actually operated the space mission, it was not incorporated into the B-
TOS model.
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The operations module has a highly modified evolution chain that begins with the
TechSat21 code developed in MIT’s Space Systems Laboratory.  In the fall of 1999,
another class used the TechSat21 operations module code as a baseline for its operations
module in a similar space systems design process.  David Ferris, a graduate student in
that class was responsible for this major revision to the operations module.  He later
updated the code for A-TOS, the first design iteration of this space mission, in the winter
of 2000-2001.  This A-TOS code was modified by author to account for different
autonomy levels and to include software estimation for the B-TOS code.
The operations module output was verified by comparing test cases against first hand
operational experience.  This served to verify that the learning curve assumptions and
labor data.  The facility construction values, for the different test cases, also matched
anticipated results.
Autonomy and Software Modeling
The space system autonomy impacts the operations model in two distinct ways.  The
software requirements for increased levels of autonomy were included in the software
development and maintenance costs.  In addition, the autonomy affected the complexity
of operations significantly.  The options available for system autonomy were
predetermined for use as an architecture variable.
With a complicated system such as B-TOS, the autonomous technology can generally be
located at a combination of three levels.  The autonomous technology can be located at
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the operations center.  This results in a high level of software complexity for ground
operations, but allows the spacecraft to remain relatively simple.  The second location
for the autonomy is on-board the spacecraft, but with swarms of spacecraft, as modeled
in B-TOS, that have mothership/daughtership combinations this can be divided into two
categories.  The mothership can have strict control over simple daughterships or,
alternatively, each daughtership, and therefore each member of the swarm, can have high
levels of autonomy.  Depending on the magnitude of the differences between the
mothership and daughtership, this final option can require significantly different set of
flight software.  The four options as summarized in Table 6-4.
Table 6-4:  Autonomy Levels
Level Result
0 Traditional level of autonomy,
no special autonomous technology use
1 Highly autonomous ground systems;
simple spacecraft software
2 Highly autonomous swarms based on an advanced mothership overseeing
simple daughterships; simple ground operations software
3 Highly autonomous autonomous swarms based on swarm-wide autonomous
capability; simple ground operations software
The estimation of software development and maintenance costs produces notoriously
uncertain results.  However, it is key to understanding the impact of autonomy on
operations costs.  The software development model was based on parametric
relationships defined in the Cost and Estimation Study Report, by the Software
Engineering Laboratory at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center [93-002].  These
relationships are based on the number of source lines of code a particular software
packages is estimated to include.  In addition, the model accounts for software reuse by
assuming 40% of ground software can be reused while 20% of flight software can be
reused.  The model does not include the potential use of COTS software.  The software
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size requirements estimates, listed in Table 6-5, are based on similar programs, but the
eventual size of new autonomous software is debatable.  Even still, the model results
depict how the relationships combine to impact the lifecycle costs.
Table 6-5:  Software Size Estimates
Model Verification
The updated operations module, with the complexity vectors included, was successfully
verified against the NASA Space Operations Cost Model (SOCM).  Version 1.0 of this
model, released in January 1998, is able to produce estimates for the costs and staffing
for space operations by a comparison of mission characteristics to current or past space
missions. [SOCM Manual, 1998]
Although it is not possible to mirror the input parameters for each model, the results
indicated that the case with four satellites was modeled successfully.  For a case with
Level 0 autonomy, the SOCM model estimated the total operations cost to be $29.4
million while the updated B-TOS model estimated $28.0 million.  The difference here is
only 5%.  The second architecture used for verification was again a four satellite case
but with full (Level 3) autonomy.  The SOCM model estimated total operations cost to
be $19.4 million while the B-TOS model estimated costs to be $20.0 million, a
difference of 3%.  These B-TOS results did not include the estimated cost to produce the












It should in no way be inferred from the above comparison that the operations module is
accurate to 5% or less.  The Space Operations Cost Model only claims accuracy of ±
20% and no better claims are made of the operations module.  The SOCM results were
also very sensitive to a number of the inputs; some shifted the operations estimate by
two to three million dollars.  It can be inferred from the comparison that the operations
module makes reasonably accurate estimations of operations cost, for the case with and
without autonomy, for a simple 4-satellite constellation.  The SOCM does not have the
ability to more than six satellites in a constellation, so the growth of operations costs
with increasing number of satellites, as modeled in B-TOS has not been verified.
Results Analysis
Tradespace Enumeration
With the results from the baseline B-TOS enumeration, it was clear that the frontier
revolved around single swarm missions that had between 4 and 13 satellites using
functionality configuration #5.  The tested enumeration for the updated model is shown
in Table 6-6
Table 6-6:  Updated Tradespace Enumeration
Architecture Variable Range
Altitude 1100 km
Number of Planes 1
Number of Swarms per Plane 1, 2
Satellites per Swarm 4, 7, 10, 13
Radius of Swarm 0.18, 1.5, 8.75, 50
Functionality Configuration #5
Autonomy 0, 1, 2, 3




The results are overlaid with the baseline data in Figure 6-9.  (Note: Figure 6-9 does not
include all the tradespace examined but concentrates on the points of interest with the
highest utility and lowest lifecycle cost.)  The circular points represent the new data that
depicts a change in the total lifecycle cost.  It can be confirmed that the utility values
were not changed with the updated model but the lifecycle costs did decrease for the
small swarms.  The grouping of points on the far left of Figure 6-9 is actually four points
virtually superimposed on each other.  The only distinguishing characteristic is the
autonomy.  As the swarm grows in size, both in radius and number of satellites, the


















Figure 6-9:  Updated Tradespace
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The effect of autonomy on the lifecycle cost is easier to view in Figure 6-10, which only
has the four groups of architectures on the frontier.  With the swarm of four satellites the
difference between fully autonomous and no autonomy is $4.5 million.  As the swarms
grow the savings from incorporating ground-based autonomy (Level 1) and swarm based
autonomy (Level’s 2 and 3) increase.  The maximum estimated savings from Level 3
autonomy, in the 13-satellite per swarm group, is almost $70 million, or 19% of the total
lifecycle costs for the mission.  It can be observed that the Level 1 autonomy provides
the largest relative decrease in costs, but Level 2 autonomy, where the swarm is
controlled by an autonomously operating mothership, is always the cheapest compared




























Figure 6-10: Impact of Autonomy on Lifecycle Cost
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To get a better understanding of the impact of autonomy on operations cost, Figure 6-11
was created using the same architectures as in Figure 6-10.  There are two important
points to capture from this figure.  The first is that the operational costs with Level 3
autonomy is always higher than Level 2.  This should be expected since Level 3, with its
large software development requirements (modeled as 100,000 more lines of codes than
Level 2) will cost more than it saves in labor costs.  The second point it that the savings
in operations costs for a highly autonomous system is on the order of 40% for swarms
with 13 satellites.  (The actual results showed the difference between the operations cost
of 13 satellites with Level 0 autonomy and 13 satellites with Level 2 autonomy is $68.8
million or 40.4%.)  For 10-satellite swarms the maximum savings is approximately 36%
and 7-satellite swarms save approximately 28%.
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These results indicate that the implementation of autonomous operations technology is
most effective when there are more than four satellites in the swarm.  This demonstrates
that it is optimal to minimize recurring costs, (e.g. operations personnel labor costs), by
focusing on nonrecurring costs (e.g. initial software development).  Since these values
are highly dependent on software costs, efforts to better estimate the cost of autonomous
software would be helpful.  Error due to this sensitivity has been mitigated by using
conservative numbers for the development of the complex software required to
implement the agent technology in Level 2 and 3.
Summary
The B-TOS model provided a useful baseline for the integration of the autonomy and
complexity operations model.  The updated code produced results that closely matched
the NASA SOCM model.  Concentrating on the frontier architectures identified in the
baseline results provided succinct example of the impact of autonomy on space






























Figure 6-11: Impact of Autonomy on Operations Costs
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operations costs and how those costs compare to the total lifecycle costs.  A savings of
up of 40% of operations costs was calculated for architectures with 13 satellites.
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Experience is what you get just after you need it.
- Anonymous
Chapter 7:  Concluding Remarks
The interview resulted in a number of disappointing, but hopeful, perspectives on
including space system autonomy into conceptual space mission design.  The trend to
use concurrent engineering to explore specific architectures integrates well with the
Space Architecture Analysis Process.  The latter can propose frontier architectures to the
former.  These processes provide a traceable requirements generation process for
customers and a strategic decision making tool for contractors.
The SAAP process, incorporating the cost saving impacts of autonomy, was
demonstrated for a scientific space mission.  The Air Force and NASA should use these
processes to evaluate conceptual designs to minimize contractor bias and understand
quantitatively which architectures will provide the highest utility for the least cost over
the system’s lifecycle.  Three strategies were developed the recommend to national
security space leadership what actions should be taken to implement a conceptual design
process that effectively analyses system level trades to meet the needs of both the
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defense and intelligence communities.  These were 1) to integrate the NRO personnel
model across the Air Force space community to ensure conceptual design teams have
adequate expertise, 2) to encourage a revolutionary concept design mentality by
minimizing the negative career impact of single failures, and 3) empower a joint
organization that can quantitatively assess conceptual space architectures and incubate
potential solutions with more detailed design studies.
Recommendations for Further Work
An accurate software development cost model can be likened to the Holy Grail for many
complex system engineers.  These models are notoriously only rough guesses.  Although
they do provide insight into the relative effects of software development costs, future
modeling efforts should be concentrated in better estimations for autonomous software
development costs.  Modeling of operations cost growth with increasing number of
satellites could also be improved, but without the actual development and fielding of
similar systems it would be difficult verify relationships more complex than those
included in the B-TOS model.
Accurate modeling of system reliability would also be very insightful for conceptual
space mission design.  Increasing the complexity of spacecraft hardware and software
will have significant effects on system reliability and availability.  If these relationships
can be quantified, they would undoubtedly provide an interesting dimension to the
tradespace.
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Final Thoughts on Conceptual Space Mission Design
This thesis successfully addressed the three objectives guiding this research.  The real-
world integration of space operations into conceptual space system design was
documented.  A quantitative means to assess different space system architectures, with
of focus on distinguishing those that account for operations issues, was developed and
tested.  Finally, this newly developed analytical method was demonstrated in the
analysis of a complex space system.  This demonstration provided specific architectural
results but the implementation process, with the complexity metric, was the focus.
The two hypotheses were also successfully tested.  The first hypothesis was that
spacecraft command and control schemes are currently designed to address development
time and costs.  The interview results showed that designers place less than adequate
emphasis on meeting operational requirements.  The second hypothesis stated that
intelligent command and control technology, which allows high degrees of space system
autonomy, is an enabling technology for highly complex space architectures.  The
modeling results showed that a significant proportion of lifecycle costs can be saved
with large space missions.  The final premise was that modeling conceptual space
system architectures provides is an easy means to assess a large numbers of unique space
architectures.  This was demonstrated in the analysis of the B-TOS mission with the
calculation of utility and cost values for 128 unique architectures.
The effective conceptual design of space missions is critical to minimized total lifecycle
costs.  The selection of which concepts, or unique architectures, to further study is a
fundamental challenge to conceptual design because it must account for the highest
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system level trades.  This research develops and demonstrates a process to analyze the
high system level trades in light of modern autonomous software development.  The
model results showed that upcoming autonomous capability is essential to minimizing
the operations costs of complex swarms of satellites.
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